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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, • . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, . . 
-v- • Case No • 18365 . 
EUGENE o. CHRISTENSEN, . • 
Defendant-Respondent. • • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged by Information with Assault 
by a Prisoner, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann.,§ 76-5-102.5 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress 
Evidence in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, 
Judge, presiding. On March 23, 1982, Judge Cornaby granted 
the Motion to Suppress based on a finding that there were no 
grounds nor probable cause for the initial arrest. The Utah 
Supreme Court granted this interlocutory appeal to review the 
lower court's pre-trial Order on May 4, 1982. The trial court 
proceedings were stayed on May 11, 1982, pending the decision 
of the Utah Supreme Court on appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a judgment and order of this Court 
declaring the initial arrest in this case to be a lawful 
arrest and vacating the lower court Order granting 
respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 24, 1981, Officers James Andrews and 
Roger Foote of the Layton City Police Department were 
dispatched to a location on ~ntelo?e Drive in Layton, Utah to 
respond to a citizen's report that there was a pickup truck 
and housetrailer stalled in the middle of the road and that 
nearby a man who appeared to be intoxicated was staggering 
down the roadway (T1 p. 8-9; T2 p. 5-7).1 Neither 
respondent, Eugene Oscar Christensen, nor his son, Brett 
Christensen, was present when the officers arrived. The keys 
were in the truck's ignition, but the officers were unable to 
start it. An inspection of the truck produced an open 
container of alcoholic beverage which was found in the truck's 
passenger compartment (T1 p. 2). 
Respondent's truck had run out of gasoline and had 
come to rest, with the housetrailer in tow, partially 
!All references to the transcript of the Pre-Trial 
proceeding of March 2, 1982 will hereinafter be designated as 
T1; all references in the transcript of the pre-trial Motion 
to Suppress proceedings of March 23, 1982 will hereinafter be 
designated as T2· 
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obstructing the travelled portion of the roadway (T2 p. 3). 
Respondent waited near the truck while his son went to get 
some gasoline, but when his son dio not return quickly he 
became impatient and decided to walk to his son's house (T2 
p. 4). Respondent's son told the officers that when 
respondent arrived at his home they immediately returned to 
the stalled truck (T1 p. 8). They arrived approximately 
five minutes after the officers arrived (T1 p. 8), and as 
they approached the officers, Officer James Andrews asked 
respondent if he was the owner and driver of the truck. 
Respondent admitted that he was the owner and that he had been 
driving it before it stalled (T1 p. 2; T2 p. 4, 8). 
Later, during the suppression proceedings, respondent 
recanted, insisting that it had been his son, not he, who had 
been driving the vehicle (T2 p. 3). 
Officer Roger Foote did not notice an odor of 
alcohol when he spoke with respondent's son, but respondent 
had been drinking (T2 p. 10; T1 p. 2). The officers 
conducted field sobriety tests and arrested respondent for 
Driving Under the Influence and Open Container in a Motor 
Vehicle (T1 p. 8). After respondent had been arrested and 
handcuffed he violently kicked Officer Andrews, striking him 
in the leg (T1 p. 3). 
Respondent was taken to the Layton City Jail. He 
asked if he could be given some medical attention for a 
-3-
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chronic back problem (T1 p. 4). According to respondent, 
his back problem had been inadvertently aggravated during the 
arrest process, causing respondent to kick Officer Andrews 
(T1 p. 3). Sometime after respondent was charged with 
Driving Under the Influence and Open Container in a Motor 
Vehicle, both misdemeanors, and also Assault by a Prisoner, a 
third-degree felony, he again retaliated against Officer 
Andrews, striking him in the face with a closed fist (T1 p. 
4) • The Information charging Assault bv a Prisoner was 
subsequently refiled after being amended to include both 
assaults by respondent ( R. 2) • 
Judge Bean of the Circuit court of Davis County 
dismis sea the Driving Under the Influence and Open Container 
in a Motor Vehicle charges and bound respondent over to the 
Second Judicial District Court for trial on the Assault by a 
Prisoner charge (R. 1). Respondent requested that preliminary 
examination of the Assault charge be waived and did not 
challenge the probable cause for the arrest at that time (R. 
1) • 
Respondent filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress 
Evidence in the District Court seeking to have suppressed the 
open container of alcoholic beverage found in the truck and 
the statements he made prior to his arrest admitting that he 
had been driving the vehicle. On March 3, 1982, Judge Douglas 
L. Cornaby granted the Motion to Suppress based on a finding 
-4-
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that there were no grounds nor probable cause for the initial 
arrest and that respondent was thereby entitled to have the 
evidence obtained prior to arrest suppressed (R. 43). 
Appellant pursued an interlocutory appeal of the 
Order suppressing the evidence in the Utah Supreme Court. 
This Court granted appellant's petition on May 4, 1982 (R. 29, 
45). On May 11, 1982, the trial proceedings in the~-instant 
case were stayed, pending the decision of this Court on 
appeal. 
Appellant takes this appeal from the pre-trial order 
granting respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to 
Rule 26(c}(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE 
ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS INVALID. 
The lower court's order granting rP-spondent's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence was based on a finding that: 
At the time of the arrest the officers had 
no grounds to make the arrest or no 
probable cause to make the arrest. • • . 
Since there was no grounds for arrest, 
there is a defense to assult [sic] by a 
prisoner and thereby he has a right to 
suppression of the evidence of the 
circumstances. 
(R. 43). Appellant submits that there was probable cause for 
the arrest which culminated in the Assault by a Prisoner 
-5-
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charge for which respondent is now being tried and that it was 
clearly error for the lower court to grant respondent's Motion 
to Suppress Evioence. 
Although the evidence suppressed is not essential to 
establish the elements of Assault by a Prisoner as charged, 
the basis for the lower court's decision--that there was no 
probable cause for the arrest--is crucial in that it 
necessarily prevents the State from prosecuting the charge. 
The statute unrler which respondent was charged provides "Any 
prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily 
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 76-5-102.5 (1978). Before respondent may be convicted 
of Assault by a Prisoner he must first be found to have been a 
"prisoner" at the time of the assault. Utah Code Ann., § 
76-5-101 (1978) provides the applicable definition of 
"prisoner": 
For the purposes of this part "prisoner" 
means any person who is in custody of a 
police officer pursuant to a lawful arrest 
or who is confined in jail or other penal 
institution regardless of whether the 
confinement is legal [Emphasis supplied]. 
It is apparent from the above definition that in order to be 
deemed a "prisoner" respondent must have been lawfully 
arrested. Because the lower court judge based the grant of 
respondent's motion on a finding that there was no probable 
cause for the arrest, or in other words that respondent was 
-6-
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not lawfully arrested, he in effect decided the issue 
perceived to be the gravamen in this case.2 If there was no 
probable cause for the arrest in this case, respondent's 
arrest could not have been "lawful." Thus, he could not have 
been a "prisoner" and as a result he could not have committed 
Assault by a Prisoner as defined by the statute. Were the 
lower court's finding of a lack of probable cause for the 
arrest correct, the State could not prove the elements of the 
offense charged. 
However, there was probable cause for respondent's 
arrest. Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2 (1978) provides that a 
police officer may arrest for a misdemeanor not committed 
2The record suggests that the lower court judge 
was inclined to adopt the view that this was the pivotal issue 
and that it would dispose of the case (T2 pp. 13-14; R. 43). 
Such a conclusion would be correct, but only with respect to 
the first of the assaults for which respondent was charged. 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-5-101 (1978) defining "prisoner" provides 
that a "prisoner" is one who is in custody pursuant to a 
lawful arrest, "or who is confined in a jail • • • regardless 
of whether the confinement is legal." The record is not 
clear, but because the second assault occurred at the Layton 
Police Department after respondent had been booked for the two 
misdemeanors and the first assault, it apparently occurred 
while he was "confined" and therefore the State might be able 
to pursue the instant case baserl solely on the second assault. 
Appellant submits, however, that the State's apparent ability 
to go forward with the assault by a prisoner charge regardless 
of the suppressed evidence or the lower court's finding of 
insufficient probable cause for the arrest is immaterial to 
this interlocutory appeal. Even if viable, the opportunity 
does not mitigate the impropriety of the Order granting the 
Motion to Suppress Evidence, nor correct the lower court's 
error. Appellant should not be forced to proceed on only one 
assault because of the erroneous ruling. 
-7-
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in his presence: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of warrant, or may without a 
warrant arrest a person: • . • 
(3) When he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) Injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
The term ''public offense" includes all misdemeanors. Oleson 
v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507 251 P. 23, 24 (1926); People v. 
Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 835 (Cal. App. 1968). "Reasonable 
cause" as used in the statute is essentially a synonym for 
"probable cause." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 
n. 3 (1959). 
that: 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
"[P]robable cause" to justify an arrest 
means facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to 
warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the 
circumstances shown, that the suspect has 
committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit an offense. 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). See also: 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). The Supreme Court has 
-8-
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also stated: 
In dealing with probable cause, however, 
as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not techn1cal; 
they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act. 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175; reh. den., 
338 U.S. 839 (1949). This Court has applied an essentially 
identical standard: 
The determination should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the 
facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which might fairly be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed 
the offense. 
State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972). 
See also: State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103, 106 
(1980); State v. Eastwood, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 
(1972); State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772, 775 
(1969). Contrary to respondent's argument in the lower court, 
the officers did not have to prove the corpus delecti of the 
crimes prior to the arrest. 
Probable cause to arrest respondent for either 
Driving Under the Influence (Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (1981)) 
or Open Container in a Motor Vehicle (Utah Code Ann., § 
41-6-44.20 (1981)) would validate the arrest in this case. 
-9-
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Examination of the information available to the officers prior 
to the arrest reveals several facts and circumstances which, 
when taken together, support the officers' determination that 
respondent committed the offenses he was arrested for: 
1. The officers had a report that an 
individual approximately matching 
respondent's description was seen 
staggering in the street and traveling 
away from the stalled truck and trailer a 
short time before the officers arrived to 
investigate (T1 pp. 8-9; T2 pp. 5-7). 
2. Respondent admitted that he had left 
the stalled vehicle to walk to his son's 
house some time before the officers 
arrived (T2 p. 4)o 
3. Respondent's son stated that upon 
respondent's arrival at the son's home, 
they immediately returned to the stalled 
truck ( T1 p. 8) . 
4. Respondent admitted that he was owner 
of the truck and had been driving it 
before it stalled (T1 p. 2; T2 4, 
8) • 3 
5. The officers discovered an open 
container of alcoholic beverage in the 
passenger compartment of the truck (T1 
p. 2) • 
6. Respondent's son did not appear to 
have been drinking (T1 p. 2; T2 pp. 4, 
8, 10). 
3Respondent would not have to have been the driver 
of the truck to be found guilty under Utah's Open Container 
statute, Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.20 (1981). The statute 
applies to all persons in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle. 
-10-
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7. The officers conducted field sobriety 
tests and determined that respondent was 
under the influence of alcohol (T1 p. 
8 ) • 
Clearly, the above information and the inferences fairly drawn 
therefrom provided reasonable or probable cause for 
respondent's arrest. Also clear is the reasonableness of the 
officers' belief that respondent might: 
(a) Flee ••• to avoid arrest; (b) 
Destroy or conceal evidence ••• ; or (c) 
Injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2(3) (1978). Respondent and his son 
returned to the stalled truck intending to fuel it and drive 
it away. The officers could have reasonably assumed that in 
order to accomplish this respondent intended to drive one of 
the two vehicles present which were owned by either respondent 
or his son. Respondent might well have left the area, making 
evidence on or in his person, or contained in the truck, 
unavailable to the officers. In addition, because respondent 
was under the influence of alcohol, his driving one of the 
vehicles from the area would have created a definite 
possibility that injury to another person or damage to 
property would have occurred. 
The arrest was valid under the requirements of Utah 
Cone Ann., § 77-7-2(3) (1978). The lower court incorrectly 
ruled that the arrest was invalid, and the grant of 
resoondent's Motion to Dismiss Evidence was error . 
.&.; 
-11-
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS 
INVALID, IT WAS ERROR TO SUPPRESS THE 
EVIDENCE ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE ARREST. 
Respondent successfully sought suppression of 
evidence obtained prior to his arrest, specifically, the open 
container of alcoholic beverage found in the truck and his 
statement to the officers admitting that he was the truck's 
owner and had been driving it before it stallen. Respondent 
did not challenge, and the court did not rely on, the 
propriety or constitutionality of the investigation of the 
truck which resulted in the discovery of the open container of 
alcoholic beverage or the query which produced the admission 
that respondent was the driver of the truck.4 The lower 
court granted respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the 
bas is that "Since there was no grounds for arrest, ••• he 
has a right to suppression of the circumstances" (R. 43; T2 
p. 14, lines 3-8). This was error because an invalid arrest 
does not require the suppression of all of the evidence of the 
circumstances gathered prior to the arrest. 
4Respondent's statement is correctly termed an 
admission, not a confession. An admission is an 
acknowledgment by the accused of certain facts which tend, 
together with other facts, to establish his guilt; a 
confession is an acknowledgment of guilt itself. Fisher v. 
United States, 324 F.2d 775 (Ca. 8 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 
9 9 9 , r eh • a e n • , 3 7 9 u • s • 8 7 3 • 
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Even if respondent was unlawfully arrested, his 
criminal prosecution would not he violative of due process 
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Frisbie v. Collins, 
342 U.S. 519, reh. den., 343 U.S. 937 (1952); State v. 
Anderson, Utah, 618 P.2d 42 (1980); State v. Beck, Utah, 584 
P.2d 870 (1978). The State may still prosecute respondent, 
either based solely on the second assault committed by 
respondent {See footnote 1, page 2), or by amending the charge 
to a lesser included offense as the State requested at the 
close of the pre-trial suppression proceedings (T2 pp. 
14-15; R. 43). The suppressed evi~ence is necessary to fully 
explain the circumstances surrounding the assaults for which 
respondent is charged. 
The suppressed evidence was obtained during the 
officers' normal performance of their duty. 
[The officers] are charged generally with 
the duty of searching out any crime, 
obtaining evidence and prosecuting those 
engaged therein. When a police officer 
sees or hears conduct which gives rise to 
suspicion of crime, he not only has the 
right but the duty to make observations 
and investigations to determine whether 
the law is being violated; and if so, to 
take such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977). In State 
v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103 (1980) this Court stated: 
-13-
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Though there may be no probable cause to 
make an arrest, a police officer may, in 
appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner, approach a person for 
investigating possible criminal behavior. 
Id. at 105. In the instant case the officers were obligated 
to investigate the unattended truck which was blocking the 
roadway and were entitled to ask respondent, when he arrived, 
whether he owned and had been driving the truck. 
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 
discussed in the pre-trial proceeding, applies to 
incriminating statements made by an accused after law 
enforcement officers have unlawfully entered an area or 
unlawfully arrested an accused and renders the "fruit" of the 
unlawful entry inadmissible as evidence. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The doctrine does not apply to 
lawful investigation and questioning occurring prior to an 
unlawful arrest. Although an unlawful arrest may taint 
subsequently obtained evidence, it would not preclude the use 
of evidence obtained prior to the arrest where the 
investigation and questioning were warranted. This is 
particularly true where, as in the instant case, the evidence 
is to be used not to establish the elements of the offenses 
for which respondent was arrested, but rather to aid in fully 
explaining the circumstances behind the two assaults which 
occurred after the evidence was legally obtained and after 
respondent was arrested. 
-14-
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Under the circumstances of this case there is no 
legal nor logical reason to suppress the evidence in question. 
The lower court's decision to do so was clearly error. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court suppressed evidence necessary to the 
prosecution based on a determination that the arrest of 
.... 
respondent was unlawful. The suppression of the evidence was 
error because the arrest of respondent clearly met the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2(3) (1978). Even if 
the arrest of respondent was invalid, it was error to suppress 
the evidence because the evidence was lawfully obtained prior 
to the arrest and because the crime for which respondent is 
being tried was committed after the arrest. 
19 82. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 
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